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THE ENFORCEMENT OF ORAL PROMISES
TO GIVE REAL ESTATE SECURITY
THEODORE A. SMEDLEYO

Whenever a series of cases involves the use of a discretionary power
by a court of conscience, the results of such cases and the reasoning advanced to support such results are certain to lack the quality of uniformity. As the discretion and the conscience of individual human beings differ, so differ the decisions in these cases. Nor can it ever be expected, even hoped, to be otherwise, because each slight variance in facts
and circumstances of one case from another may and often should tip
the balance of justice on one side or the other. The necessity of adhering to a uniform system could readily become an intolerable restraint
on the efforts of the courts to obtain the proper solution to the problems raised in the litigation. However, freedom from the necessity of
following a set standard of decision may also lead to interminable confusion. If no precedent is to be observed as binding, or even strongly
persuasive, individuals have no means of ascertaining their rights and
liabilities, attorneys have no bases for arguing their clients' claims in
the courts, and the courts themselves have no guides to direct the
course of their decisions. Non-uniformity becomes chaos, and litigation becomes pure gambling, turning on the flip of a court's conscience.
A better demonstration of the above truths could hardly be found
than in the attempts of American courts to determine what effect
should be given to oral promises to give real estate security for a loan
or some similar obligation. The one point of general agreement in
this question is that the giving of a legal mortgage on real estate involves such a transfer of an interest in land as to come within the scope
of the Statute of Frauds.' Thus, a purely oral promise to give a security
interest in realty does not constitute a mortgage nor give any lien in the
eyes of a court of law, no matter how solemn nor well-evidenced the
oral promise may be. Since equity is known to be able in many circum*Assistant Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
'Brown v. Stapleton, 24 N. E. (2d) o9 (Ind. 194o) ; Washington Brewery Co. v
Carry, 24 Ad. 151 (Md. 1892); Brown v. Drew, 67 N. H. 569, 42 At. 177 (1894);
Feldman v. Warshawsky, 125 N. J. Eq. 19, 4 A. (2d) 84 (1938); Rutherford National
Bank v. Bogle, 114 N. J. Eq. 571, 169 At. 18o (1933); Sleeth v. Sampson, 237 N. Y.
69, 142 N. E. 355 (1923); Newman v. Newman, 1o3 Ohio St. 230, 133 N. E. 70 (1921);
"Meachv. Stone and Perry, 1 D. Chip. 182 (Vt. 18x4); Blake v. Blake, 98 W. Va. 346,
128 S. E. 139 (1925); Jones, Mortgages (8th ed. 1928) § 75, 27 C. J. 218, Statute of
-Frauds § 198.
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stances to remedy the shortcomings of legal relief, and since equity
courts can be especially adept at side-stepping the obstacles of a statuteprescribing formalities, 2 it is natural that the courts of equity are frequently asked to decree the enforcement of oral security promises. The
number and variety of different views which have been expressed in
answer to requests for such equitable relief are amazing.
Take as an example the cases arising with these somewhat oversimplified facts as a nucleus. Landowner makes an oral agreement with
lender that if the latter will lend a stated sum of money on stated terms,
landowner will give a mortgage on his property to secure the repayment of the loan. The money is advanced and accepted, but for some
reason a formal mortgage is never executed. Landowner failing to repay the loan, lender seeks the aid of equity to declare and enforce hissecurity in the land.3 Perhaps the leading case in the field is Sleeth v.
Sampson, decided by the New York Court of Appeals in 1923, ruling
that the lender is not entitled to the lien sought.4 However, two earlier
2Consider, for instance, the power of equity to grant specific performance of
oral contracts to convey land absolutely, Clark, Principles of Equity (igig) § 13o;
McClintock, Equity (1936) § 55; and to declare a deed absolute in form to be ai
mortgage, Jones, Mortgages (8th ed. 1928) § 34o; Walsh, Mortgages (1934) § 7; Oral-.
Understandings At Variance With Absolute Deeds, (1939) 34 Ill. L. Rev. 189.
8In asking equity to give him the benefit of the promised security, the bor-rower may present his request in various forms. The bill may be for specific performance of an oral contract to give a mortgage; it may ask for the declaration and/
foreclosure of an equitable lien; or it may seek to impress a lien on land; or some
other variation of one of these phrases may be employed.
It is to be understood that in case the rights of any bona fide purchaser of a
legal interest from the landowner intervene, such rights will be superior to the
claims of the borrower, who has merely an equitable interest. This discussion is
intended to consider only the situation in which no such third parties are involved,
so that the issue is simply as to the rights between lender and borrower. The authorities cited will go to this issue only, unless the contrary is expressly stated.
However, this is not to say that persons in addition to the lender and borrower
may not sometimes be involved. Creditors of the borrower are certainly interested,
as are purchasers or incumbrancers who for some reason may not be classed as bona
fide purchasers. No attempt will be made here to designate precisely what persons.
would stand prior to the lender in claiming an interest in the land. A few cases.
bearing on this point are: Farmers' State Bank v. St. Aubyn, 12o Kan. 66, 242 Pac.
466 (1926) ; Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 97 Kan. 408, 155 Pac. 791 (9 16); Lane v. Lloyd,
33 Ky. L. 570, 11O S.W. 401 (19o8); Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Kimble, 132 Neb.
408, 272 N. W. 231 (1937); Herring v. Whitford, i 9 Neb. 725, 232 N. W. 581 (1930);
Bloomfield State Bank v. Miller, 55 Neb. 243, 75 N. W. 569(1898); West v. First
Baptist Church of Taft, 123 Tex. Civ. App. 388, 71 S.W. (2d) iogo (1934).
'237 N. Y. 69, 142 N. E. 355 (1923). It has been said that this case was properly
decided because the loan was not actually made, and therefore no basis for an equitable mortgage was present. Walsh, Mortgages (1934) § 8, p. 48. However, Mr. Justice
Cardozo, writing the opinion for the New York Court of Appeals said: "Some money
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New York cases are the authorities most often cited for the proposition
that the lender should be given the benefit of the security orally
promised to him.5 In New Jersey, cases are on record from 18io to 1937
upholding the propriety of equity's affording relief to the lender, 6 but
in 1938 the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals, in a 9-6 decision,7
reversed a lower court decision which had granted specific performance of the oral promise,8 apparently believing that the established
rule of New Jersey was being invoked. The West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals in 1925 decreed specific performance of the oral
promise, even though counsel for the plaintiff did not think to argue
his case on this theory.9 Yet eight years later the same court, with three
of the same judges still on the bench, held that no such relief could be
given, 10 the court seemingly not remembering the existence of the
earlier decision. In an old Maryland case,21 the court went out of its
way to rule that the Statute of Frauds did not apply in such a case (the
defendant had not contended that it didl), but within two decades the
12
same court, reaching the opposite result in the same kind of a suit,
took occasion to flay the former opinion unmercifully. In their "extreme generality" the earlier statements of the court would, "if adopted
:as rules of decision ... operate as a judicial repeal of the statute of
frauds."' 8
The central bone of contention in most of these cases was whether
,r not the effect of the Statute of Frauds could be obviated by finding
sufficient part performance by the lender-promisee to enable equity to
decree that the landowner-promisor must specifically perform his part
was then handed to the borrower, though exactly how much the witness who overheard the conversation was unable to state." 237 N. Y. 69, 71-2, 142 N. E. 355, 356
(1923).

5Sprague v. Cochran, 144 N. Y. 104, 38 N. E. ooo (1894) ; Smith v. Smith, 125
N. Y. 224, 26 N. E. 259 (1891). In Sleeth v. Sampson, the New York Court of Appeals
declared that the above cases were not authority contrary to the decision reached
in Sleeth v. Sampson, and that only the dicta in those cases suggested a disagreement. 237 N. Y. 69 at 73, 142 N. E. 355 at 357 (1923).

'Dean v. Anderson, 34 N. J. Eq. 496 (181o) (not reported until 1881); Clark v.
Van Cleef, 75 N. J. Eq. 152, 71 Atl. 26o, 262 (19o8); Rutherford National Bank v.
Bogle, 114 N. J. Eq. 571, 169 At. i8o (933); Feldman v. Warshawsky, 122 N. J.
6
Eq. 59 , 196 At. 205(1937).

'Feldman v. Warshawsky, 125 N. J. Eq. 19, 4 A. (2d) 84 (1938).
'Feldman v. Warshawsky, 122 N. J. Eq. 596, 196 Ad. 205 (1937).
'Blake v. Blake, 98 W. Va. 346, 128 S. E. 139 (1925).
"Spencer v. Williams, 113 W. Va. 687, 170 S. E. 179, 89 A. L. R. 1451 (1933).
"Cole v. Cole, 41 Md. 301 (1875).
"Washington Brewery Co. v. Carry, 24 Ad. 151 (Md. 1892).
"Washington Brewery Co. v. Carry, 24 At. 151, 152 (Md. 1892).
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of the oral agreement. Here, as in cases involving oral land sale contracts, a difference of opinion exists as to what constitutes sufficient
14
part performance to take the case out of the operation of the Statute. It
is to be noted in passing, that this disagreement in turn springs from
a lack of consensus as to the basis and origin of the part performance
doctrine itself.' 5 While these arguments rage, other authority contends
that the issue is irrelevant entirely because the part performance doctrine of land sale cases is not applicable to oral security promise cases
in any event, 16 and some go so far as to cut the ground from under
the whole basic issue of how equity can avoid the Statute of Frauds
by declaring that the Statute was never intended to extend to cases
calling for such special functions of equity powers. 17 On the other extreme, there is an occasional refusal to recognize that equity courts
even have jurisdiction in the cases under consideration, because the
lender's remedy at law is adequate.' 8
Cases holding for or against the lender's prayer for relief are frequently based on inadequate authority,19 and when confronted with
"'Compare the two opinions in the Feldman case, 122 N. J. Eq. 596, 196 Ad.
205 (1937) and 125 N. J. Eq. 19, 4 A. (2d) 84 (1938). Also compare Sleeth v. Sampson,
237 N. Y. 69, 142 N. E. 355 (1923) and Spencer v. Williams, 113 W. Va. 687, 170 S. E.
179, 89 A. L. R. 1451 (1933) with Rutherford National Bank v. Bogle, 114 N. J. Eq.
571, 169 At. 18o (1933) and Blake v. Blake, 98 W. Va. 346, 128 S. E. 139 (1925).
15See Meach v. Stone and Perry, 1 D. Chip. 182 (Vt. 1814); Clark, Principles of

Equity (1919) §§ 131-135; McClintock, Equity (1936) §§ 55-56; Walsh, Equity (193o)
§§ 78-79.
1'Walsh, Equity (1930) §§ 62 and 85; Walsh Mortgages (1934) § 8.
"Schram v. Burt, 111 F. (2d) 557 at 562 (C. C. A. 6th, 1940) ; Sprague v. Cochran, 144 N. Y. 1o4 at 113, 38 N. E. ooo at 1002 (1894). See Costigan, Interpretation
of the Statute of Frauds (1919) 14 Ill. L. Rev. i. The last reference makes an argument that the original framers of the English Statute of Frauds specifically intended that it should apply only to law courts. The cases cited apparently derive their
authority from the clause found in some modern Statutes of Frauds, to the effect
that interests in land raised by operation of law are not within the mandate of the
Statute. See note 42, infra.

"Compare Newman v. Newman, 1o Ohio St. 230, 133 N. E. 70 at 75 (1921) and
Spencer v. Williams, 113 W. Va. 687 at 688, 170 S. E. 179 at i8o, 89 A. L. . 1451 at
1453 (1933) with Hughes v. Mullaney, 92 Minn. 485, ioo N. W. 217 at 218 (19o4) and
Blake v. Blake, 98 W. Va. 346 at 350, 128 S. E. 139 at 141 (1925). Also Hicks v. Turck,
72 Mich. 311, 40 N. W. 339 (1888) and Irvine v. Armstrong, 31 Minn. 216, 17 N. W.
343 (1883) (written promise).
19Brown v. Stapleton, 24 N. E. (2d) gog at 91(Ind. 1940) (ruling that oral
promise is within Statute and therefore unenforceable is made in a subdordinate
clause, no authority cited); Brown v. Drew, 67 N. H. 569, 42 Atl. 177 (1894) (one
paragraph opinion); Aaron Frank Clothing Co. v. Deegan, 204 S. W. 471 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1918) (rules on Statute of Frauds issue in two sentences; one of two cases
cited is a trust case, and several Texas cases to contrary are ignored) ; Williams v.
Rice, 6o Mich. 102, 26 N. W. 846 (1886) (decision to enforce lien made in two
sentences, no authority cited).
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a precedent contrary to the result desired to be reached, courts have
been known to distinguish the troublesome precedent with little more
20
than a hollow oratorical flourish.
In this mass of irreconcilables, generalizations must be somewhat
tenuous. Probably the numerical weight of authority is represented
by cases enforcing the lender's lien on the land in one manner or an-

other.21 But the opinion is here ventured that there has been at least
a noticeable trend since about 1920 toward the decision that the lender
can be given nothing on the basis of the oral promise of his debtor
to give security. Thus, since the case of Sleeth v. Sampson in 1923,22
New York has held to the rule that the oral promise will not be enforced, though the earlier decisions in that state were thought to hold
to the contrary. 23 As already stated, New Jersey reversed its field in
1938, in a positive, if not well-considered, decision in Feldman v. Warshawsky. 24 In 192 1, Ohio joined the jurisdictions denying relief.25 Also
already referred to is West Virginia's turn about between 1925 and
1933.26 Kansas, after having pursued an unusually intelligent course
"OFor instance, Feldman v. Warshawsky, 125 N. J. Eq. 19, 4 A. (2d) 84, 85 (1938).
The chancery court had relied upon Dean v. Anderson, 34 N. J. Eq. 496 (1810)
which had been widely cited as authority in other cases. In reversing the chancery
court decision, the Court of Errors and Appeals disposed of this old and venerable
precedent with this observation: "In Dean v. Anderson there was a complicated
situation of exchange of properties, involving a mortgage. All the deeds were executed and delivered and all that remained was the delivery of one mortgage." The
court did not take the trouble to explain just why these facts were significant as
distinguishing factors. Actually they seem to have provided no sensible distinction.
2Of some sixty-odd cases found which turn on this issue, or consider it directly, approximately forty favored an enforcement of the lien on one theory or
another. It is not pretended that these cases make up an exclusive list of the litigation in the field, but it is believed that they include the most important decisions
and are representative of the entire body of the case law on this point.
'237 N. Y. 69, 142 N. E. 355 (1923). The exact issue of Sleeth v. Sampson seems
not to have arisen again in New York, but numerous lower court decisions have
cited the case as authority on related issues. See S. W. Straus and Co. v. Felson,
216 App. Div. 431 at 433, 215 N. Y. Supp. 534 (1926) (action at law for damages
for breach of oral promise to give security); Sinclair v. Purdy, 213 App. Div. 439 at
447, 21o N. Y. Supp. 208(1925)

(action for specific performance of oral contract

to convey land); Life Savers' Club, Inc. v. Mosher, 125 Misc. 341 at 342, 209 N. Y.
Supp. 741 (1925) (same) ; Matter of Estate of Schreier, 153 Misc. 711 at 712, 275 N. Y.
Supp. 932 (1934) (construction of will to determine whether mortgage is interest in
real property) .
"Sprague v. Cochran, j44 N. Y. 1o4, 38 N. E. woo (1892); Smith v. Smith, 125
N. Y. 224, 26 N. E. 259 (1891) - See note 5 supra.
2125
N. J. Eq. 19, 4 A. (2d) 84 (1938).
=1o3 Ohio St. 230, 133 N. E. 70 (1921).
"OBlake v. Blake, 98 W. Va. 346, 128 S. E. 139 (1925) and Spencer v. Williams,
ii3 W. Va. 687, 17o S. E. 179, 89 A. L. R. 1451 (1933).

1941]

THE ENFORCEMENT OF ORAL PROMISES

215

for several decades, in 1938 seems to have slipped into a rut of faulty
reasoning in denying enforcement of an oral security promise. 27 In
other jurisdictions the decisions have been too uncertain or the cases
28
too few to allow classification as to late tendencies.
2TCassity v. Cassity, 147 Kan. 411, 76 P. (2d) 862 (1938). Earlier cases in Kansas
granting relief on proper reasoning: Farmers' State Bank v. St. Aubyn, 12o Kan. 66,
242 Pac. 466 (1926) ; Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 97 Kan. 4o8, 155 Pac. 791 (1916);Foster
Lumber Co. v. Harlan County Bank, 71 Kan. 158, 8o Pac. 49 (19o5).
'The courts seem to have leaned toward favoring relief in Minnesota: see
Irvine v. Armstrong, 31 Minn. 316, 17 N. W. 343 (1883); Hughes v. Mullaney, 92
Minn. 485, 1OO N. W. 217 (i9O4); Hecht v. Anthony, 204 Minn. 432, 283 N. W. 753
(1939) granting relief. But see dictum in Butler Bros. Co. v. Levin, 166 Minn. 158,
207 N. W. 315, 316-317 (1926); Renville State Bank v. Lentz, 171 Minn. 431, 214 N. W.

467, 468 (1927) ; Hatlestad v. Mutual Trust Life Ins. Co., 197 Minn. 640, 268 N. W.
665, 667-69 (1936), where the Minnesota court definitely indicates its approval of
Sleeth v. Sampson. Also in Texas: See Bagley v. Pollock, 19 S. W. (2d) 193 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1929); Floyd v. Hammond, 268 S. W. 146, 147 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); Pipkin
v. Bank of Miami, 179 S. W. 914, 915-17 (rex. Civ. App. 1915); McCarty v. Brackenridge, i Tex. Civ. App. 170, 20 S. W. 997, 1001 (1892), approving, in dictum, at least,

the doctrine that a lien may be given on the basis of an oral promise. But see Aaron
Frank Clothing Co. v. Deegan, 204 S. W. 471 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918); West v. First
Baptist Church of Taft, 123 Tex. 388, 71 S. W. (2d) lo9o, 1OO (1934), where the

court denied that a lien on realty can be given by oral agreement. Also in Michigan
where three old cases and a recent federal court case allowed a lien to be enforced
on the basis of an oral promise: Williams v. Rice, 6o Mich. 102, 26 N. W. 846
(1886); Osgood v. Osgood, 78 Mich. 290, 44 N. W. 325(1889); Whitney v. Foster,
117 Mich. 643, 76 N. WV.114 (1898); Schram v. Burt, 111 F. (2d) 557 (C. C. A. 6th,
194o); and see Steggall v. Steggall, 274 Mich. 402, 264 N. W. 842 (relief denied because claimant failed to sustain burden of proving oral agreement). But see Cheff
v. Haan, 269 Mich. 593, 257 N. W. 894, 896-97 (1934) criticizing the ready granting
of liens on oral promises and limiting the scope of such relief.
Relief has been favored, mostly in older cases which are apparently unquestioned, in Arkansas: King v. Williams, 66 Ark. 333, 50 S. W. 695 (1899); Lowe v.
Walker, 77 Ark. 103, 91 S. W. 22 (1905); Florida: Craven v. Hartley, 102 Fla. 282,
135 So. 899 (1931); Illinois: Grigaitis v. Gaidauskis, 214 Ill. App. 111 (1919); Iowa:

Vigars v. Hewins, 184 Ia. 683, 169 N. W. 119 (1918); Oklahoma: Allender v. EvansSmith Drug Co., 3 Ind. Terr. 628, 64 S. W. 558 (191o); see Nelson v. King, 92 Okla.
5, 217 Pac. 36o (1923); Oregon: see Tucker v. S. Ottenheimer Estate, 46 Ore. 585, 81
Pac. 360, 361-62 (19o5); South Dakota: Baker v. Baker, 2. S. D. 261, 49 N. W. 1O64
(1891); Hollister v. Sweet, 32 S. D. 141, 142 N. IV. 255 (1913); Wisconsin: Poole
v. Tannis, 137 Wis. 363, 118 N. W. 188 (19o8); Ludwig v. Ludwig, 170 Wis. 41, 172
N. W. 726 (1919).

Early decisions, still apparently unimpeached, denied relief in Indiana: Irvin
Adm'r. v. Hubbard, 49 Ind. 350 (1874); also Brown v. Stapleton, 24 N. E. (2d) gog
(Ind. 194o); Missouri: Wooldridge v. Scott, 69 Mo. 669 (1879); New Hampshire:
Brown v. Drew, 67 N. H. 569, 42 At. 177 (1894); Tennessee: Durant v. Davis, 57
Tenn. 425, 1O Heiskell 522 (1873); Vermont: Meach v. Stone and Perry, i D. Chip.
182 (Vt. 1814). Nebraska seems committed to the same view by two modern cases:
Herring v. Whitford, 119 Neb. 725, 232 N. W. 581 (193o); Penn Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Kimble, 132 Neb. 408, 272 N. W. 231 (1937).

Opinion in Kentucky appears to be about evenly divided: see Keeton v. Owens,
228 Ky. 522, 15 S. W. (2d) 487, 488 (1929); Lane v. Lloyd, 33 Ky. L. 57o, 11o S. W.
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As to the reason for this apparent shift of opinion, one can only
speculate. Perhaps the tendency against granting relief is traceable to
the increasing popularity in these cases of the part performance doctrine, and to the narrowing of this doctrine generally, evidenced in
the stiffening reluctance of courts to allow the Statute of Frauds to be
circumvented except where the part performance will actually (not
merely possibly) leave the promisee with irreparable losses unless
specific performance is granted. 29 Or perhaps the judiciary is becoming of the opinion that in these days of universal education and a
plentiful supply of legal counsel there is no excuse for the failure to
put business transactions in written form as required by statute. With
this view the writer has no quarrel. If the aim of the courts is to force
upon the business public a more orderly system of dealing, it seems
hardly open to question that the goal is a desirable one. But as to the
methods used to attain this purpose, there is strong need for more
consideration. Nor is the need for dearer thinking confined to the decisions denying enforcement of the oral promise to give security, for
courts granting the relief do so as often as not on inaccurate reasoning.
The difficulty experienced by the courts in making sound determinations in these cases springs from the seeming close parallel between
the situations in which a landowner has promised orally to give security in the land, and that in which a landowner has promised orally to
sell the land. The promise to convey the security interest is thought to
be equivalent to the promise to convey the absolute title, and the return promise to lend money is presumed to stand in the same position
as the vendee's promise to pay the purchase price for the land. Since
the Statute of Frauds is held to cover both conveyances of an absolute
title and of a security interest, the courts, having accepted the analogy
between the two situations as being complete, naturally have reached
the conclusion that the same manner of avoiding the effect of the
Statute must apply identically whether the case involves an oral
30
promise to sell land or an oral promise to give security in land.
401, 402 (igo8); Sandy Hook Bank's Trustee v. Bear, 252 Ky. 6o 9 , 67 S. W. (2d) 972,
974 (1934)-

21In four jurisdictions, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, Tennessee, the
part performance doctrine has been completely rejected: Clark, Principles of Equity
(1919) § 134; McClintock, Equity (1936) § 55. That the stricter view of when specific performance will be given is increasing in favor: Walsh, Equity (193o) § 78.
"'For example: Sleeth v. Sampson, 237 N. Y. 69, 73, 142 N. E. 355, 356 (1923) "We
see no distinction in this respect between a payment for an absolute conveyance and
a payment for a mortgage"; Feldman v. Warshawsky, 125 N. J. Eq. 19, 4 A. (2d) 84,
85 (1938) . In virtually every security promise case turning on the part performance
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Further examination of the two transactions, however, quickly
brings to light several significant differences. In the first place, the intention of the contracting parties with regard to the land is not the
same. The prospective vendee has the essential aim and purpose of
obtaining ownership of the land, presumably motivated by such considerations as an expectation of taking produce from the land, or selling the land for profit, or making a home on it, and so on. The lender,
on the contrary, ordinarily has no direct designs on the land itself.
He does not particularly care to possess the land and has no specific
intention of becoming its owner, either immediately or in the future;
his desire is to assure the repayment of the money being loaned to the
landowner. He takes the borrower's promise that the land shall stand as
security because the land seems to be the best assurance of repayment
that the borrower can give. Had some personal property been available
for as sound a security, or some obligation of personal suretyship, the
lender would probably have been as well satisfied.
From this factual difference arises a difference in the relief needs of
the vendee and the lender. Since the vendee wants the land, and since
land is regarded as of such an unique character that the loss of land
cannot be compensated for in money damages, the need of the vendee
for equitable relief arises instantly upon the making of the oral promise to convey the land. Whether he has or has not paid any or all of
the purchase price, he stands in need of the assistance of equity if he
is to be made whole. In fact, the full payment of the purchase price
adds not one ounce to the weight of his plea to the equity court, for
he is always presumed to be able to recover back by a law action the
money paid out in reliance on the landowner's unfulfilled promise to
convey land.3 1 As has been pointed out, the lender's desire is the repayment of his loan. Thus, until that loan is made, until the money
is actually advanced to the borrower, the lender is in no position to
seek the aid of equity. The making of the promise to give security
establishes no "equity" in the promisee, as does the making of the
promise to sell. The promisee in the first situation needs no equitable
aid at this time because he is thought to have a complete remedy at
doctrine, there is a tacit assumption that the part performance rules of the sale
contract cases applies with the same effect in security promise cases.
"1This statement cannot of course be true in two jurisdictions which appear to
hold that mere payment of the purchase price is sufficient part performance by the
vendee-lowa and Georgia. And in other jurisdictions, payment of the price may
lend weight when accompanied by other acts of performance. But standing alone,
the payment does not give any more of an "equity" than the vendee already had
as a result of the making of the promise to convey.
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law in the form of an action for damages for breach of contract. For
unless the borrower will carry out his promise to give security, the
lender is persumably justified in refusing to make the loan, and the
total result is that the lender loses the prospective profits of the deal.
These profits will be his damages awarded in a law action.3 2 Now
when the loan is actually made on faith of the promise to secure, the
lender's status changes. From the moment the money is advanced to
the borrower, the lender needs equitable assistance, because unless
the borrower gives the security as promised, the lender stands to be
irreparably injured.33 That is, he will have to take his chances as an
unsecured creditor-exactly the thing against which he sought to contract-and no judgment at law for damages can make him anything
but an unsecured creditor as to past transactions 3 4 Although there has
been some confusion on the point, it should be understood that no
right of a lender to enforce a promise to give security should accrue
until he has actually made the loan. 6
OIt may be argued that if there is not a written promise, the law courts will not
recognize an action for damages. However, the action is for breach of the contract
to accept a loan on certain conditions (including the giving of security in land), and
is not for the breach of the contract to give a mortgage. Thus it is believed that a
law court can grant damages for the loss of profits expected to be obtained through
the loan transaction-i.e., interest charges. The oral promise to give security is not
being enforced in such an action; rather it is only significant as being a condition
of the loan which, when refused by the borrower, justified the lender in regarding
the loan contract as breached.
At any rate, the absence of a legal right because of the absence of writing is
not considered such a circumstance as to create an inadequate remedy at law. Failure
to meet legal formalities, without more, obviously cannot be the basis of an equitable right.
uHicks v. Turck, 72 Mich. 311, 40 N. W. 339 (1888) (written promise); Irvine
v. Armstrong, 31 Minn. 316, 17 N. W. 343 (1883); Dean v. Anderson, 34 N. J Eq.
496 (81o) ; Blake v. Blake, 98 W. Va. 346, 128 S. E. 139 (1925) ; McClintock, Equity
(1936) § 58, p. 97; Walsh, Equity (193o) § 85.
"Of course, as a judgment creditor he may perfect a lien which will give him
priority over general creditors of the borrower, and over subsequent lien creditors.
But such a lien is not enough to save the lender, because other intervening lien
creditors will be superior in right even though they may not be in the class of "bona
fide purchasers" who would have priority over the equitable lien interest based on
the oral promise to give security. Also, as some cases have mentioned, resorting to
a damages action involves the loss of the intended investment: Hicks v. Turck, 72
Mich. 311, 40 N. W. 339(1888) (written promise); Irvine v. Armstrong, 31 Minn.
316, 17 N. W. 343 (1883); Hughes v. Mullaney, 92 Minn. 485, ioo N. W. 217 (1904).
Further, the judgment lien will ordinarily come too late to aid the lender, because
the borrower will have become insolvent, and damages judgments will be uncollectable. Dean v. Anderson, 34 N. J. Eq. 496 (181o); McClintock, Equity (1936) § 58,
P. 97.
"TFred T. Ley and Co. v. Wheat, 64 F. (2d) 257 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1933); Iowa Loan
and Trust Co. v. Plewe, 202 Iowa 79, 29o N. W. 399 (1926); Milam v. Milam, 138
Tenn. 686, 200 S. W. 826 (1918); Walsh, Mortgages (1934) § 8.
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Thus, the security and sale cases are in contrast both as to the
point at which the need for equitable relief arises in the promisee, and
as to the basis on which this need for equitable relief rests. This
contrast is dearly demonstrated where the promises to sell or to give
security are in writing, the Statute of Frauds problem thus being eliminated. When the written promise to sell land is made, the vendee is
in position to seek specific performance of the contract, regardless of
whether he has already paid the purchase price, because he wants to
own the land, and cannot be compensated in money if he is deprived
of this ownership. The lender, even under a written contract to give
security, has no claim to equitable relief until he has advanced the
money to the borrower, and then his need for relief springs not from
the unique value of land but from the fact that only by being given
security can he have a complete remedy for the borrower's breach of
contract.
It was these factors upon which Professor Walsh based his categorical declaration that "these cases of equitable mortgages have nothing to do with the doctrine of part performance under the Statute of
Frauds."3 6 Evidently this statement is intended to refer to the law as
it should be, and not as it actually is, if many of the decisions are taken
as an indication of how the law presently stands. For these decisions
commonly argue not the issue whether the part performance doctrine
is applicable, but rather merely whether there has been sufficient performance under the doctrine. The point of Professor Walsh's theory is
passed by without even being noticed. This judicial snub results from
a failure to realize the basis of the Walsh concept of the source of the
lender's equity. The lender seems to be asking for a decree of specific
performance, as does the vendee. From this it would seem to follow
that his equity rests on his "right"3 7 to have equity grant the decree.
And does not this "right" depend on the same considerations in the
security as in the sale cases? The answer is no, but the fault in the
courts' reasoning lies not only in the last step (though this is certainly
open to criticism, as will be observed later); the basic fault is in the
first and second steps-the assumption that the lender's equity depends
on his right to a specific performance decree. His equitable right
§ 85, p. 414; Walsh, Mortgages (1934) § 8.
"'Right" is technically a misnomer because the issuance of specific performance
decree is said to be a discretionary power of equity. The remedy is a matter of grace,
not of right. Miller v. Gardner, 198 So. 21 (Fla. 194o); Chesapeake and Ohio Ry Co.
wWalsh, Equity (193o)

v. Douthat,

o S. E. (2d) 881 (Va. 1940); McClintock, Equity (1936) § 52; Walsh,

Equity (193o) §

19,

p. 82-83.
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springs from the fact that only by his being given the security intended
can he be made whole. It is true that in cases where an oral promise
to secure has been made by the borrower, equity in awarding the
lender the benefit of the security is in effect granting specific performance of the promise. But this is only incidentally so, for it is admitted
by all that the recognition of rights under the broad equitable liens
concept includes the granting of a variety of types of relief in addition
to ordering the specific performance of express promises.38 In granting
such relief, equity acts under broader and more elastic powers than
merely its ability to grant specific performance. Stated in most general
terms, it is the power to work justice. Expressed in maxims, it is the
power of equity "to regard that as done which should have been done"
or "to prevent the Statute of Frauds from being made an instrument
of fraud," and so on. The granting of specific performance of oral
promises is only one example of the processes used by equity in executing its fundamental function of preventing injustice and of ordering
fair dealing. In confining themselves to the use of this particular
method 'in the security cases, the courts are mistaking an incident of
their powers for a limitation upon those powers.
It must be noticed that not all courts have fallen into such error.
Decisions are available which show a better understanding of the
true situation. One of the best statements appears in the Kansas case
'Schram v. Burt, iii F. (2d) 557 at 561-62 (C. C. A. 6th, 1940); Craven v. Hartley, 102 Fa. 282, 135 So. 899 at goi (1931); Rutherford National Bank v. Bogle, 114
N. J. Eq. 571, 69 At. 18o at 182 (1933); Clark v. Armstrong and Murphy, x8o Okla,
514, 72 P. (2d) 362 at 365 (1937); Hollister v. Sweet, 32 S. D. 141, 142 N. W. 255 at 256
(1913); Walsh, Equity (1930) §§ 52, 85; Walsh, Mortgages (1934) § 8.
Common demonstrations of the power of equity to grant liens on land irrespective of the intention of the parties include: Equitable mortgages raised in
absence of any promise to give security, see C6nkling v. Conkling, 126 N. J. Eq. 142,
8 A. (2d) 298 (1936); Wright v. Buchanan, 287 Ill. 468, 123 N. E. 53, 57 (919).
Vendor's and vendee's liens on land granted, see Elterman v. Hyman, 192 N. Y. 13,
84 N. E. 937 (19O8); Craft v. Latourett, 62 N. J. Eq. 2o6, 49 Atl. 71, (1901); Schram
v. Burt, iii F. (2d) 557 at 561-62 (C. C. A. 6th, 1940) (comparing vendor's lien
with lien based on oral security promise); Sprague v. Cochran, 144 N. Y. 1o4, 38
N. E. ooo at 1002 (1894) (same). "Equitable liens" granted, based on unfair
or fraudulent conduct of the defendant, similar in nature to constructive trusts, see
Ringo v. McFarland, County Judge, 232 Ky. 622, 24 S. W. (2d) 265 (1930) (presenting a situation appropriate for either constructive trust or equitable lien relief) ;
Jones v. Carpenter, go Fla. 407, io6 So. 127 (1925). Constructive trusts, raised on
the basis of "fraud," which fraud in some jurisdictions may be no more than an unjust refusal to perform a promise made in good faith, see Becker v. Neurath, 149
Ky. 421, 149 S. W. 857 (1912); Edwards v. Culbertson, iii N. C. 342, 16 S. E. 233
(1892).
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of Foster Lumber Co. v. Harlan County Bank,3 9 which held that the
lender had a lien of an equitable mortgage on the borrower's land,
dating from the time of the making of the loan in reliance on the oral
promise to give a mortgage. The oral character of the security agreement was declared not to affect the validity of the lender's lien, this
because "the lien actually decreed results from the operation of the
law upon the entire conduct of the parties, and hence is, in terms, excluded from the inhibition of the statute." 40 There is some mention in
the opinion of the power of equity to treat that as done which under
the agreement ought to have been done, and the necessity of preventing
the Statute of Frauds from becoming an engine of fraud. It must be admitted that some quoted reference is made to the fact that the agreement had been executed on one side and thus is removed from the
application of the Statute. But that the Kansas court realized the
proper ground for the enforcement of the lien is indicated by a later
case which cites the Foster Lumber Co. case as authority for the proposition that "liens in the nature of equitable mortgages based upon
oral agreements are not at all uncommon, and they are upheld and
enforced where equity and good conscience so require."41 The Florida
1071 Kan. 158, 8o Pac. 49 (1905). The prospective landowner orally promised
to give a mortgage on land to secure a loan to be made by the Bank. The land had
not yet been purchased but the prospective landowner had a contract of purchase
which he left with the Bank to hold until a formal mortgage should be executed.
The Bank then paid the loan money out for purposes as designated by the borrower, including a payment of part of the price of the land, and the Bank, as authorized took the deed to the land from the vendor (apparently the borrower being
named as grantee). The borrower refused to give the promised mortgage, instead
mortgaging the property to the Lumber Company. The latter had full notice of the
claims of the Bank. In a suit by the Bank to collect the amount due on the loan,
the court awarded it a lien on the land, this lien being expressly based on the oral
promise to give a mortgage, as distinguished from any rights which might have been
claimed on the basis of the deposit of a title deed.
1071 Kan. 158, 8o Pac. 49, 50 (19o5).
'"Farmers' State Bank v. St. Aubyn, 12o Kan. 66, 242 Pac. 466, 468 (1926)
(italics supplied). This case has been interpreted, wrongly, it is submitted, as having turned on the part performance doctrine. See Hanna, Cases and Materials on
Security (ist ed. 1932) p. 535, note i.
This interpretation is based on the attention given by the court to the fact
that the representative of the lender took (or continued in) possession of the
property after the oral promise to give security was made. It was thought that this
taking of or continuing in possession was esteemed to be a sufficient part performance to take the case out of the Statute of Frauds. Apparently some argument
against such a ruling was made by the borrower's counsel, but a careful reading of
the court's opinion indicates that the only regard in which the court considered the
possession of the lender was on the issue of whether such possession gave notice of
the lender's interest to a third party who purported to have purchased the property from the borrower. 242 Pac. 466 at 468.
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court in Craven v. Hartley held that the oral promise to give a real
estate mortgage was not invalidated by the Statute of Frauds; it declared that "The doctrine of equitable liens does not depend on written instruments, but may arise from a variety of transactions to which
equity will attach that character ...

not obnoxious to the statute of

frauds because they arise by operation of law from the conduct of the
parties." 42 In other jurisdictions the courts have from time to time
given clear and appropriate accounts of their powers to enforce equit43
able liens based on oral security promises.
Far more common of occurrence in cases in which enforcement of
oral security promises is sought, are the decisions which turn on the
issue of part performance. In Sleeth v. Sampson,44 already mentioned as
a leading case, the court, after declaring that giving a mortgage is
transferring an interest in land under the Statute of Frauds, found only
one issue remaining in the case-"whether there have been acts of part
'45
performance sufficient to relieve from the production of a writing."
The court ultimately denied that the oral promise could be enforced
because it appeared that the lender's performance went no further than
a payment of the loan to the borrower, while to be sufficient to overcome the absence of writing the part performance must be "'unintelligible or at least extraordinary' unless related to a contract to convey
an interest in land." 46 It was observed that in land sale contract cases,
payment of the purchase price alone is not enough to meet this standard; there must also be such acts as taking possession of the land or
or making improvements thereon. And "we see no distinction in this
;Craven v. Hartley, 1o Fla. 282, 135 So. 899, 9o (1931).
The use of the phrase "operation of law" is apparently a reference to the exception incorporated in some Statutes of Frauds to the effect that there need be no
writing to support the creating or granting of interests in land by operation of
law. See Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws (Skillman, 1927), Tit. I, Ch. 1, § 566o; Kan. Gen.
Stat. (Corrick, 1935) § 33-105. Such provisions are virtually legislative declarations
of the validity of the powers which are exercised by equity courts without the aid
of statutory authorization-i.e., powers to ignore the formal requirements of the
Statute of Frauds when such procedure is necessary to reach a just result. No case
should turn on the presence or absence of this exception in the Statute. These
qualifications in the Statutes of Frauds have seemingly never been thought to refer to matters arising in courts of law; certainly they do not affect the rule that a
legal mortgage must be in writing.
"Schram v. Burt, iii F. (2d) 557 at 562 (C. C. A. 6th, 194o); Sandy Hook Bank's
Trustee v. Bear, 252 Ky. 6o9, 67 S. W. (2d) 972 at 974 (1934) (court refused lien because of special circumstances); Sprague v. Cochran, 144 N. Y. 104 at 112, 38 N. E.
oo at 1002 (1894); Poole v. Tannis, 137 Wis. 363, 118 N. W. 188 at 189 (19o8).
"237 N. Y. 69, 142 N. E. 355 (1923).

"5237 N. Y. 69, 73, 142 N. E. 355, 356 (1923).
"237 N. Y. 69, 73, 142 N. E. 355, 356 (1923)-

1941]

THE ENFORCEMENT OF ORAL PROMISES

223

respect between a payment for an absolute conveyance and a payment
47
for a mortgage."
It may be said that the fault in this case and in a number of others
which are decided in the same manner,48 lies with the lender's counsel
who shaped his prayer for relief along specific performance lines, and
so argued his case in the courts. However, in other situations the procedure in courts of equity has proved to be sufficiently flexible to allow
the courts to give relief when a meritorious case is presented, even
though it be presented in unfortunate terminology. 49 And in fact we
can be sure that it is not the form of the request which governs the
answer, because equally respectable courts have refused relief on the
same reasoning where the plea was that the court should "impress a
lien," or "foreclose an equitable lien" on the land, or where some
other slight variation of this phraseology was used. Newman v. Newman 5o was an action "to subject lands to a lien." After disposing of the
lender's argument that a constructive trust should be declared, the
Ohio court suggested the possibility of giving relief in the form of an
equitable mortgage; but this theory too was held unavailing because
mere payment of the consideration is not sufficient to relieve an oral
agreement to convey an interest in real estate from the operation of
the Statute of Frauds. In the Feldman case the New Jersey Court of
Chancery granted the prayer in an action to have an equitable lien or
mortgage impressed on land. Though the promise to give the mortgage
N. Y. 69, 73, 142 N. E. 355, 356 (1923).
'Washington Brewing Co. v. Carry, 24 Ad. 151 (Md. 1892); Brown v. Drew, 67
41237

N. H. 569, 42 Ad. 177 (1894) ; Bernheimer v. Verdon, 63 N. J. Eq. 312, 49 At. 732
(1901); Meach v. Stone and Perry, 1 D. Chip. 182 (Vt. 1814).
"See McClintock, Equity (1936) §§ 13, 28 and 5o; Walsh, Equity (193o) § 22.

See as examples of the adaptability of equity courts in this respect: Jones v. Gainer,
157 Ala. 218, 47 So. 142, 143 (1908) (though specific performance decree is denied

because plaintiff fails to prove the contract as alleged, equity will declare a lien on
the land for money expended by the plaintiff in improving the land,' even though
plaintiff did not seek such relief) ; Bourke v. Hefter, 202 Ill. 321, 66 N. E. 1084 (1903)
(equity granted personal judgment against defendant, though this type of remedy
was not asked for in the complaint); Sanitary District of Chicago v. Martin, 227
Ill. 260, 81 N. E. 417 (1907) (specific performance denied on ground of unreasonable hardship to defendant, but equity assessed damages for the default, though
damages were not sought in plaintiff's complaint) ; Jackson v. Stevenson, 156 Mass.
496, 31 N. E. 691 (1892) (injunction against violation of building restriction
denied because enforcement would be inequitable, but damages were assessed for
breach of restriction, though not sought by complaint); 25 R. C. L. 345 (though
specific performance decree cannot be given because defendant can not convey
good title, damages will be awarded for breach of contract to convey, though not
sought in complaint).
D1 0 3

Ohio St. 230, 133 N. E. 70 (1921).
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as security for a loan actually made was oral, the court, finding that
the evidence clearly indicated that the oral promise had been made as
the lender declared, granted specific performance with the statement
that the fact of the agreement being verbal was immaterial "since
equity looks to its purpose and intent rather than to its form." 51 Clinging ever to the part performance theory, it was decided that in New
Jersey payment of the consideration in reliance on,the oral promise
was sufficient part performance to remove the case from the bar of the
Statute of Frauds. This last proved to be more than the Court of Errors
and Appeals could accept. That court reversed the decision of the
Chancery Court, on the ground that a case of part performance was
not made out merely by the payment of money.52 In Spencer v. Williams,53 the West Virginia court was asked to impress a lien on land,
on the basis of an oral promise by the owner to give a mortgage on
the realty as security for the repayment of a loan. The court replied
that it could not grant specific performance of the promise because in
that jurisdiction such remedy was available only where the agreement
was so far executed that a fraud would be worked on the petitioning
party unless specific performance were decreed. It is interesting to note
that this court went on to observe that no fraud would result here because the lender had a full remedy at law in the form of an action to
recover back the money loaned. In fact, the lender showed that, relying on the oral security promise, he had waited so long to seek repayment from his borrower that now the Statute of Limitations barred
any right of action at law-therefore not even a theoretical remedy at
law existed. In this encounter, however, the court turned the lender's
own weapon upon him by concluding that to give equitable relief in
such circumstances would be to "put a premium on his delay." 54
It is hardly understandable how the West Virginia court could
reach this decision when only a few years before it had decided a very
similar case exactly in the contrary manner. 55 The opinion in this
case of Blake v. Blake stands as almost a point to point refutation of
the law as announced in the Spencer decision. First the opinion points
out that the lender has no adequate remedy at law, because an action
at law would force the lender to rely only on the personal liability of
his borrower, which was exactly the eventuality intended to be avoided.
Only equity has the power to give him what he must have to be made
mFeldman v. Warshawsky, 122 N. J. Eq. 596, 196 At. 205, 2o8 (1937).
OFeldman v. Warshawsky, 125 N. J. Eq. 19, 4 A. (2d) 84 (1938).
11i3 W. Va. 687, 170 S. E. 179, 89 A. L. R. 1451 (933).
Un3 W. Va. 687, 688, 17o S. E. 179, i8o, 89 A. L. R. 1451, 1453 (1933).
15Blake v. Blake, 98 W. Va. 346, 128 S. E. 139 (1925).
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whole-the security as promised. Then the court inquired of itself
whether specific performance could be granted when that type .of relief was not expressly asked for. This question was answered affirmatively on the basis of the general prayer for relief included in the
plaintiff's bill, for under a general prayer, the plaintiff is entitled to
any relief justified by the evidence. On the issue of the significance of
the parol form of the borrower's promise, the court concluded that in
this type of case the acts of the lender in advancing the money so that
nothing remained to be done to complete the transaction except the
execution of the mortgage, constitute sufficient performance to take
the oral contract out of the Statute of Frauds. And equity will decree
the relief because the borrower's refusal to execute the security instrument works a fraud on the lender. Finally, it was denied that the long
delay in seeking judicial enforcement of the agreement could be said
to make the lender guilty of laches, because the lender at no time had
shown any disposition to abandon his claim, and because the delay
had benefitted, rather than injured the borrower.
Indicative of the temper of the courts is the fact that even when
relief is to be granted to the lender, the specific performance remedy
and the part performance doctrine bob up to plague the argument.
Of course this is in no sense an error in itself, for admittedly the
granting of specific performance of an oral promise on the basis of the
part performance doctrine is one process which equity may invoke to
give the lender his needed security. The danger springs from the
demonstrated tendency of courts to go one step further and conclude
that this is the only method open to them in such cases. It is that condusion which brings forth such decisions as those discussed above.
One suspects from the language used in the opinion of Blake v. Blakethat even there the court felt that its choice was to give specific performance or nothing-else why the particular effort to establish sufficient acts of part performance. In this respect it in nowise stands;
alone. 56 For example, in Rutherford National Bk. v. Bogle 57 the court
r"Of course it cannot be said absolutely thht the courts in the following cases
would not have granted relief on some other theory had the part performance doctrine not been available; but that impression lingers after a reading of the opinions. See Cole v. Cole, 41 Ind. 3o (1875); Hecht v. Anthony, 204 Minn. 432, 283
N. W. 753 (1939); Rutherford National Bank v. Bogle, 114 N. J. Eq. 571, 169 Atl.
18o (1933); Clark v. Van Cleef, 75 N. J. Eq. 152, 71 At. 26o (19o8) (relief denied
because claim was barred by limitations); Dean v. Anderson, 34 N. J. Eq. 496.
(181o); Tucker v. S. Ottenheimer Estate, 46 Ore. 585, 81 Pac. 36o (105) (relief denied because of special circumstances); Baker v. Baker, 2 S. D. 261, 49 N. W,
1064 (1891).
57114 N. J. Eq. 571, 169 Ad. 18o (1933)-
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was apparently off to a perfect start in exercising its equitable powers
to enforce a lien. It stated that "the whole doctrine of equitable liens
or mortgages is founded upon that cardinal maxim of equity which regards as done that which has been agreed to be, and ought to have
been, done." And "the form which an agreement shall take in order
to create and equitable lien or mortgage is quite immaterial, for equity
looks at the final intent and purpose, rather than at the form."5 8 But
following these pronouncements, the court seemed to lose some of its
enthusiastic confidence in the power of equity to drive straight to the
goal of justice, for it soberly observed that since a mortgage involves a
transfer of an interest in land, it must meet the dictates of the Statute
of Frauds. And "an agreement to give a mortgage upon land is likewise within the inhibitions of the statute and unenforceable if not in
writing unless there has been sufficient part performance to remove it
from the bar of the statute." 59 Hence the vital issue here was whether
there had been sufficient acts of part performance. The court eventually decided that there had been these required acts, and a happy ending was reached. But the whole decision shows disturbing confusion
in the court's mind regarding its authority to grant relief to lenders in
search of promised security. Four years later the same court, in the
person of the same Vice-Chancellor, redeemed itself admirably by
pointing out that the power to grant specific performance on the basis
of part performance by the promisee is "aside from and in addition to
to" 60 the powers of equity to declare a lien under various other doctrines, expressed in such declarations as "treat that as done which ought
to have been done," "prevent the perpetration of a fraud," and "give
effect to puriose and intent rather than to form." Other courts would
better serve the interests of equity and good conscience, justice and
fair dealing if they would better understand the source and foundation of their power to enforce the borrower's promise to give security.
This discussion is not to be understood as a plea for the unquestioned enforcement of every assertion made by lenders that their borrowers have orally promised to give security. Beyond any doubt, such
action would result in an unending procession of frauds, for every
lender anxious about the chances of enforcing the personal liability
of his debtor would have but to raise the claim that an oral promise to
SRI14 N. J. Eq. 571 , 169 At. i8o, 182 (1933).
so'14 N. J. Eq. 571, 169 At. 18o, 183 (1933).
Feldman v. Warshawsky, 122 N. J. Eq. 596, x96

Ad. 205, 2o8 (1937). Ironically enough, the Feldman decision was reversed, 125 N. J. Eq. 19, 4 A. (2d) 84 (1938),
while the Rutherford decision stands unimpeached.
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give security had been made, whereupon a lien on the borrower's land
might be established. Before any court ventures to impress a lien on
land in these cases, it must use every means to make sure that the oral
promise was actually made as contended and that the lender is not asserting a false right. To this end, courts should and often do require
that the lender assume the burden of proving his case and of offering
evidence of clear and convincing nature.6 ' With strict standards of
proof applied, very few fraudulent claims would prove successful.
Even conceding that an occasional lender might obtain the benefit of unwarranted security, can it be said that any particularly lamentable injustice has resulted? What the lender obtains is no more than
just payment of a perfectly honest debt. The borrower has simply been
forced to satisfy a valid obligation. The only parties possibly standingto be unjustly deprived of anything are creditors of the borrower,
whose claims might have been satisfied out of the debtor's propertyhad the other lien not been enforced against it. But the total assets ofthe debtor have been at one time, at least, augmented by the moneys.
advanced by the lender, and why should other creditors be entitled
to benefit exclusively from this increase in the debtor's resources? On.
the other hand, observe the unfortunate consequences of refusing a,
valid security claim of the lender. In the usual case the debtor's personal liability will be no more valuable than the lender has esteemed
it to be, and thus the lender will be unable to collect his debt, or at
least all of it, even though he thought he had provided against the very
contingency which has arisen. Other creditors will profit by the enrichment of the debtor's estate resulting from the advancement of the
loan.
In this consideration lies another distinguishing feature between
security cases and land sale cases. The enforcement of a fraudulent
claim that an oral promise to convey land was made, results in the
landowner being deprived of his land when there has been no intent
on his part to risk his ownership in any way. Of course he receives the
consideration which the purported vendee admits in order to make his
claim enforceable, but the very fact that the owner resists the action
indicates that he was unwilling to part with his land for that price.
The claimant is correspondingly unjustly enriched by receiving the
land for the price paid. The failure of the court to recognize a valid
O'Steggall v. Steggall, 274 Mich. 402, 264 N. W. 842 (1936); Feldman v. Warshawsky, 122 N. J. Eq. 596, 196 Ad. 2o5 (1937); Dean v. Anderson, 34 N. J. Eq. 496 (1910);
Nelson v. King, 92 Okla. 5, 217 Pac. 36o (1923).
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-and true claim in land sale cases prevents the vendee from making
'expected profits from the purchase of the land. If the vendee has paid
part or all of the purchase price in advance, he stands to lose at least
part of this if the vendor is insolvent and cannot satisfy a judgment at
law for the return of the price paid. The vendor merely remains in the
position formerly occupied-owner of the land.
It thus appears that the consequences of refusing to enforce an
honest claim that an oral security promise was made are more unIfortunate than those resulting from the inability of a vendee to obtain
-specific performance; that the wrong done the landowner when a
fraudulent security claim is enforced is not so harsh as where a false
sale claim is enforced; that therefore, the courts should be quicker to
enforce an alleged oral security promise than an alleged oral sale
promise; that the standards built up to control the sale cases should
thus not be applied blindly in the security cases. In rebuttal of the
above comparisons, it may be argued that there is no difference in the
possible prejudice to the vendee and lender where an honest claim is
rejected because the lender loses money which would represent a payment of the debt while the vendee loses money which would represent the return of the purchase price advanced-this in case of the inability of the landowner to satisfy personal liabilities. In fact, however,
looking at the problem from the standpoint of what the usual circumstances will be, there is a distinction. For while the vendee may or
may not have paid the purchase price in advance, the lender always
will have made the loan. The making of the loan is the essence of his
need for relief, whereas the vendee's need for relief arises with the
promise to convey. Thus, in every case in which a lender needs the
equitable relief, the result of a refusal to grant his request will lead to
a loss of the entire amount loaned-assuming an insolvent debtor; but
in only some of the cases in which a vendee needs equitable relief will
a denial of equitable aid result in a loss of the purchase price.
A further advantage will often stand with the vendee as contrasted
with the lender, where both have actually advanced money to the
landowner. In the normal case the vendee learns within a relatively
short time after paying the purchase price that the vendor is refusing
to carry out his oral promise to convey. The vendee then is warned to
take steps to recover his money promptly, lest the landowner become
insolvent. On the other hand, the lender in the normal case may continue for a considerable time in reliance on the borrower's oral promise,
and not find out until the debt has matured that the borrower intends
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to repudiate his security agreement. In the lapse of time between the
making of the loan and the discovery that no security exists, the borrower has often in fact become bankrupt and unable to pay his
debts. A remedy at law which was perfectly adequate had it been
recognized as necessary to pursue, becomes as a practical matter no
62
remedy at all.
One further practical distinction appears in any comparison of
sale and security cases when the part performance doctrine is under
consideration. In a very large majority of the American states the
courts have decided that mere payment of the purchase price by the
vendee is not sufficient part performance upon which to decree the
specific performance of an oral promise to convey land. 63 The reasoning advanced to support this rule takes two different forms, depending on the particular court's conception of the basis of equity's power
to obviate the Statute of Frauds by application of the part performance doctrine. One view is that equity will enforce the oral promise
where the acts of part performance have put the vendee in such a
position that it is impossible except by granting specific performance
to place him back in as good a situation as he stood before the oral
contract was made. To refuse enforcement is said to countenance a
OSee Dean v. Anderson, 34 N. J. Eq. 496 (1810). Some cases stress the lender's
loss of his "investment" as an irreparable injury which would result from a denial
of equitable relief. The idea advanced is that even if money damages can be recovered, such an award falls short of the redress required to make the lender whole.
Irvine v. Armstrong, 3i Minn. 316, 17 N. W. 343 (1883); Hicks v. Turck, 72 Mich. 311,
40 N. W. 339 (1888) (written agreement). It has been said that the remedy at law is
not adequate even where the borrower is solvent and there is a written agreement,
because only nominal damages will be given for the breach until such time as an
enforcement of the security is needed. McClintock, Equity (1936) § 58, p. 97.
A further question as to the adequacy of a damages remedy must remain unanswered for lack of authority. It is: Does the refusal of the borrower to give the
security entitle the lender to declare the loan agreement rescinded and sue immediately to recover back the money advanced? The discussion in the text presumes an affirmative answer. If this is not correct, the lender is in a still worse
position than that already described, because then the repayment of the principal
of the loan can not be compelled until the agreed maturity date, and the lender's
hands are thus tied during the interval in which the borrower may be becoming
insolvent and judgment-proof. It is arguable that since the security promise is
merely an incident to the loan transaction, the default on the promise is not suffici'
ent to abrogate the essential purpose of the parties to make and receive a loan. If
it is true, as McClintock states, that only nominal damages for the breach of a
security promise could be obtained even where the promise is in writing, this
may mean that the lender could not recover back the loan until the regular
maturity date.
'3Clark, Principles of Equity (1919) § 131; McClintock, Equity (1936) § 56;
Walsh, Equity (1930) § 78.

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. If

fraud on the vendee, or to subject him to irreparable injury. A different view is that equity will enforce the oral promise where the acts
of part performance are such as to evidence clearly that an oral
promise to convey was actually made by the lender. Here it is said
that the acts must be "unequivocally referable" to a contract to convey, or "unexplainable except as related" to such a contract. Though
a stricter standard of performance is probably applied by the courts
following the first theory, it is agreed that mere payment of money
is not enough under either view, because the vendee can be made
whole (theoretically, at least) by an action at law to recover the
money back, or because the payment of money refers as much to
other possible transactions as to a conveyance of land. Added acts required are commonly the vendee's taking of possession of the land or
his making valuable improvements on the land. 64 Though it is open
to serious question whether such additional actions in fact do make
the performance "unequivocally referable" to a contract or subject
the vendee to irreparable injury, nevertheless they are the forms of
conduct which in most of the cases have persuaded the courts to decree specific performance. Conversely, the absence of such conduct is
most frequently the reason for the courts denying that relief.
Consider then, the chances of a lender to show sufficient part performance in the great majority of our American courts. A prospective
purchaser of land may commonly take possession of land and make
improvements before title is actually transferred to him. How often
does a lender who has loaned on the security of his borrower's land
enter into possession of the land or make improvements on it? The
answer is very, very seldom. In fact, only two cases have been found
in which this procedure occurred. And in both of them there existed
a family relationship between lender and borrower, so that the taking
of possession was actually to be explained on the basis of the kinship
of the parties rather than on their lender-borrower status.6 5 In applying sale promise rules to security promise situations, the courts are
virtually denying that a remedy of specific performance exists in the
latter cases. If a part performance doctrine is to be used in security
O'Clark, Principles of Equity (1919) §§ 132-134; McClintock, Equity (1936) § 56;
Walsh, Equity (1930) § 78.
e&Charpie v. Stout, 88 Kan. 318, 128 Pac. 396 (1912) (lender was a sister of the
borrower, and the latter stated that he put his sister in possession of the land "so
as to give her something to live upon."); Smith v. Smith, 125 N. Y. 224, 26 N. E.
259 (1891) (lender was husband of borrower; former owned the land then conveyed
it to his wife, the two of them living on the land with the husband managing it;
husband spent substantial sums in improving the land after its conveyance to
wife).
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cases, it must be a different doctrine, designed to take cognizance of
the facts which normally exist in security cases.
By way of summary, the writer ventures to outline a correct process of reasoning in the decision of such a case as is presented by the
simple hypothetical fact situation posed early in this discussion. First,
it is to be conceded that a defence of the Statute of Frauds must be
met, because a contract to give security in realty is a contract to
transfer an interest in land and therefore is required to be in writing
to be enforceable. But while courts of law have been strictly ruled by
the dictates of the Statute, equity has often declared its power to
ignore the formal requirements if only by such measures may justice
be served. Equity has jurisdiction to act because in the usual circumstances attending these cases, the lender has no adequate remedy at
law; only by the processes of equity can he be given the relief necessary to save him for an irreparable injury, for only equity can decree
him a secured creditor. That equity should act is argued by the same
fact-a just and equitable conclusion to the whole transaction can be
attained only by the lender being given the benefit of security in the
land. Without this relief, a deceitful borrower will have perpetrated a
plain fraud on the lender, will escape his obligation to pay an honest
debt, and will leave to other creditors the unearned privilege of sharing assets contributed by the lender. All this assumes the ability of
the court, by applying strict requirements of proof, to make sure
that the borrower actually made the oral promise as contended by
the lender. No reference to "specific performance" and no mention
of "part performance" need be made; nor should they be made, lest
the issue be confused by the use of oft-confusing terminology. The
remedy should be given under the broadest and most fundamental
function of equity, and not under one of the small segments of that
function. And whatever the form of the prayer for relief, such relief
as the facts call for should be given, without question of whether a just
remedy can be applied if not requested precisely in the proper words.
If this be treason in the form of a judicial repeal of the Statute of
Frauds, let the powers of equity make the most of it. And if the considered opinion of the lawmakers is that the interests of orderly and
careful business methods demand that in no case shall lenders be
given the benefit of security in land unless there has been a written
agreement for security, then let the legislature speak with a definite
command directed to the courts of equity. 66
OlAn indication of precisely the opposite legislative sentiment may be thought
to exist in the "except by operation of law" qualifications found in several Statutes
of Frauds. See notes 17 and 42, supra.
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